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A Cinema of Desire: Cinesexuality and Guattari’s Asignifying Cinema 
 
‘Desire is forced to maintain itself’ writes Guattari, ‘in this space between reality and 
pleasure, this frontier that power jealously controls with the help of innumerable frontier 
guards: in the family, at school, in the barracks, at the workshop, in psychiatric hospitals 
and, of course, at the movies.’ (1996a: 144) 
 
While Félix Guattari has written only a small amount of work on cinema, his 
philosophical work frequently resonates around power and desire in relation to signifying 
systems.  Reading cinematic images along traditional paths of signification affirms the 
dialectic between subject and image that maintains established power structures. 
According to Guattari signification, ‘impose[s] a semiotic modelling on the body. And 
this is political. One must start modelling people in a way that ensures their semiotic 
receptiveness to the system.’ (1996d: 22) There is power in the reiteration of 
signification. Semiotic structures do not subject people to meaning. They allow them to 
become meaningful within systems established before their existence. Subjection to 
signification – what Deleuze and Guattari call signifiation – frequently operates through 
selecting from binary options, where one term is subjugated to the other. The subjugated 
binaries which will be important to this essay are women (to men), body (to mind), 
expression (to signification) and asemiotics (to semiotics). This article will first describe 
the benefits and risks in challenging projects of signification as they relate to feminism. I 
will then point out the ways in which the desiring event of cinema – what I have termed 
‘cinesexuality’ – can reorient and rupture structures of signification through a focus on 
expression. The relation of cinesexuality to feminism will then be drawn, using Guattari’s 
notion of asemiotic bodies: the ‘homosexual’ and ‘woman’. This will be followed by 
some brief sketches toward thinking cinesexuality as a form of ‘becoming-woman’. The 
cinesexual emphasises cinematic pleasure as asignified, pleasure beyond signification 
that then challenges how genders, and indeed individuals as their own collective of 
disparate modalities, desire cinema.    
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Rethinking cinema can alter the way women have been both denied a specific gaze and 
have been defined as gazing either masochistically or transvestically, while 
acknowledging all spectators desire cinema in excess of the meaning of images and their 
deferral to established sexualities. Cinema is a nexus of reality/phantasy, offering planes 
of pleasurable intensity of colour, framing, celerity and sound – what Guattari calls 
cinema’s asignifying elements. In this way desire for and in cinema reflects the 
ambiguities and problems psychoanalysis has found when addressing the ‘question’ of 
women’s desire. Woman’s desire does not necessarily fit into the phallic oriented 
structures of psychoanalysis, and pleasure in cinema does not correlate with structures of 
heterosexuality and homosexuality. Heterosexual and homosexual desire are based on the 
affirmation of the gender of the object of desire which, depending on whether the object 
is the same or different, will thus constitute sexuality. Asignified aspects of cinematic 
pleasure complicate the gendering project traditional structures of sexuality maintain.  
 
My project of exploring the assemblage of cinema and viewer is simply an isolation of a 
frequent social situation. There is a contradiction here, as I am demarcating the cinematic 
event in order to challenge broader social paradigms, hence insinuating to rethink cinema 
is to rethink the world. However challenging cinematic paradigms can inevitably alter the 
conception of other structures of signification of desire as all systems, while not 
reflecting, affect others as eddies and flows affect the whole ocean. More important to 
this particular project is the specificity of cinema, the unique moment of desire only 
available to us through that ‘cinema’ feeling, cinema as a lover we take, a form of 
sexuality which is not translatable to any other circumstance. In cinema we experience 
worlds which are neither available nor repeatable in the world outside the screen, thus 
their ability to be contained by signification is jeopardised. What does it mean to desire 
cinema? To desire cinematically? What is this ‘thing’ cinema that we desire?  
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Language, Systems, Signs 
 
Cinema and feminism have been seduced and betrayed by the attractions of 
psychoanalysis and structuralism. Both describe the structuration of the subject; the way 
in which the subject is mapped through signifying systems. Psychoanalysis emphasises 
the gender of the spectator as it corresponds to or differs from, and hence desires, the 
male ‘subject’ or female ‘object’ on screen. According to Guattari, cinema is populated 
with asignifying intensities: ‘linkages, internal movements of visual images, colours, 
sounds, rhythms, gestures, speech, etc.’ (1996a: 150) These escape significations of 
gender and hetero or homosexuality, but are nonetheless pleasurable aspects of cinema. 
Problems with psychoanalysis come not from what it says, but what function the form of 
speech has and what values and meanings this speech augments or repeats. Guattari 
points out: ‘Desire is power; power is desire. What is at issue is what type of politics is 
pursued with regard to different linguistic arrangements that exist.’ (1996d: 20) 
Psychoanalytic film theory translates a particular arrangement of desire into cinematic 
scenarios.  Briefly the male spectator’s gaze is presumed active/sadistic and heterosexual 
in his objectification of female forms. The female spectator is denied a gaze proper, 
relegated to masochistically identifying with the objectified woman on screen. 
Traditionally, psychoanalytic film theory shares much in common with other modes of 
epistemological mappings of the subject, from the medical to the familial. Kaja 
Silverman writes: ‘Like the male subject, the female subject emerges only within 
discourse…Both are spoken by discourses and desires which exceed them. However, 
whereas the male subject has privileges conferred upon him by his relationship to 
discourse, the female subject is defined as insufficient through hers.’ (131) Woman’s 
insufficiency – her lack – refers neither to her flesh nor to her subjectivity, but to her 
ability to navigate within and be conceived by systems that dam up intensities. Signifying 
systems defer images, experiences and intensities to established signs and the relations 
between them, thus crystallising their ambiguities as meaningful objects with inherent 
value (or devalue). Guattari describes structuralism’s project of signification as trying 
‘moreover to systematically inject meaning into all signifying regimes that tend to escape 
it.’ (1996a: 149-150) Women escape phallic systems and those of signification, but they 
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also enable such systems by being examples of what the valued terms in these systems 
are not. Gender and binary relations, such as male/female, hetero/homo and 
passive/active are affirmed.1 Thus women are insufficient and exist sufficiently 
nonetheless, they are both less than one (castrated) and more than one (plethora).  
 
Women are seen as a ‘question’ or ‘problem’ in psychoanalysis and in society because 
they both confound and repudiate the system of one – one meaning, one object 
(symbolised through the phallus) and one self. While women cannot define themselves 
they cannot, technically, ‘be’. The power of women as confounding signification is not 
that they offer an alternative, but they make a fiction of the power to subsume anything 
by ‘knowing’ it, while resisting being representative of a single alternative to it. Similarly 
the way we desire planes of cinematic intensity unique to the screen world makes a 
fiction that cinema is a version of actual sexuality simply repeated on screen. 
Cinematically woman is given meaning through deferral to the higher order of ‘not-man’ 
or ‘object of desire (usually for the pleasure of the male character and/or spectator)’. 
Woman is not, according to Irigaray  
 
(a) unit(y), such as a letter, a number, a figure in a series, proper noun, unique 
object…by closing herself up over the unit of conception, by curling around that one, 
her desire hardens. Perhaps it becomes phallic through this relationship to the one? 
And likewise a femininity that conforms and corresponds too exactly to an idea – Idea 
– of woman, that is too obedient to a sex – to an Idea of sex – or to a frozen sex, has 
already frozen into phallomorphism. (229) 
 
Woman in cinema is taken as fetish (a part which stand in for a whole), or object for male 
desire. The female spectator’s desire remains an unresolved issue. This question risks 
defeating its own revolutionary possibilities by being answered. As soon as woman’s 
desire ‘is’, it is essentialised. This conundrum of demanding the power to name oneself, 
while risking essentialisation through such naming, is one which has plagued feminism.  
Simply because these systems refuse to acknowledge women as independent entities, 
does not mean women cease to exist. In 2000 Alison Butler asked ‘what kind of future 
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might there be for feminist film [theory and practice]?’ (73)  She cites queer films, films 
which deconstruct masculinity, and films which ‘offer the pleasures of [female] 
specificity and a systematised understanding of femininities.’ (77) Butler’s claim that 
femininity has specificity, and it should be systematised is, at best, a reversal of 
patriarchy. At worst it is a colonisation of the admittedly problematic but also potentially 
liberating asignified planes of pleasure women have received from film both in spite of 
and because heterosexual patterns within film theory repudiate their gaze and their 
control. Butler’s claim raises the volatile issue of the question ‘what is woman’ which, 
even if located around history, is answered by the depressing and pessimistic response 
that all women are is shared oppression. Shared oppression, like power in masculinity, is 
a matter of degree. All subjects share forces of both, complicating the dualism of 
oppressor and oppressed, of power and resistance. No subject is only oppressed or only 
resistant. Jackie Byars, after Nancy Chodorow, claims that post-psychoanalytic feminist 
film theory perspectives are trans-gendered, and ‘the male is rooted in objectivity and 
impartiality while the female perspective is based on a blurring of boundaries between 
self and other, allowing feelings to influence thought’ (113).  Byars reverses value rather 
than challenging stereotypes. I imagine Byars means ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ rather 
than male and female. Freud had already demarcated this ambiguity within each subject 
as a mixture of masculine and feminine. ‘The reactions of human individuals of both 
sexes are, of course, made up of masculine and feminine traits.’ (339) Is Byars’ a really 
post-psychoanalytic perspective? While it emphasises the ambiguity of femininity, does it 
challenge polarised significations within trans-gendered spectatorship? The problem with 
much post-psychoanalytic feminist film theory is the reliance on exchanging binaries and 
their associated terms. What happens when there is sexuality without the possibility of 
heterosexual or homosexual union? What happens to gender if sexuality is not based on 
oppositional terms?  
 
Modal Memories: Feminism and Cinesexuality 
 
Within the question ‘what do I see and do I desire it’ we can include ‘how am I affected 
by the multi-sensorial visual plane’? Cinema is not dialectic, it is an event. The screen is 
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frontier limit. A situation is a positioning of (usually) two. An event describes the 
encounter, the act rather than the position of two ‘subjects’ (as much as a film can be 
called subject). The event of viewing includes but is not limited to a constellation of 
body, desire, memory, inclination, environment, image and affect, more or less important 
in each instance.2 The self as modalities then forms the spectator component within the 
viewing machine. Self is expressed as a constellation of modes. At any one time self is 
extricated from others, self as memory, self as phantasy, self as warring or contradictory 
desires; the subject as a particular coalescence of intensified or decreased modes. All of 
these modes are copresent within the one space, even before time, which transforms each 
plane of intensity and distributes modalities at every infinitesimal moment. While not 
wishing to claim women and men watch differently, it would be foolish to claim any 
viewer watches independent of their history of their relationship to signifying regimes. If 
viewing self includes a modality of memory (including individual and social history) 
assembled as an immanent remembered present with screen, then the particularities of 
that memory, including its oppressions, subjugations and powers, are copresent with the 
event. One’s self is mapped according to the importance placed upon these memories and 
the modal configurations they make with the present self. The self is interactive or 
interceded with and by memories of subjectivity and can acknowledge the importance of 
this subjectivity in the act of viewing depending on which modalities are intensified. 
Memory is the making concrete of the generalised other which Benhabib sees is essential 
to recognise in a making-ethical of post-structural theory for feminism. She points out 
Lyotard’s contrasting of ‘ “the grand narratives” of the Enlightenment to the “petit recits” 
of women, children, fools and primitives.’ (15) She criticises Modernity and Post-
Modernity because in both ‘the paradigm of language has replaced the paradigm of 
consciousness’ (208, original emphasis) Consciousness is awareness of memory, not the 
conscious as opposed to the unconscious which, in schizoanalysis is copresent with 
consciousness as the asignified aspects of cinema are copresent with those aspects we 
tactically find meaning in, meaning which, as in our selves as conscious-unconscious 
assemblage, flees before it is apprehended. While I say we must think the act of viewing 
beyond dualisms, including those of gender, I am adamantly not saying a future beyond 
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dualism is a forgetting of the histories and memories of suffering and oppression, and the 
acts of power, experienced and expressed by individuals and groups of subjects.  
 
Spectator and screen form a machinic assemblage. Machinic should not be confused with 
mechanical. ‘Machinic configurations do not recognise distinctions between persons, 
organs, material flows, and semiotic flows.’ (1996:46) The spectator and screen machine 
is a ‘composition of deterritorialising intensities’ (1992: 38). It is an arrangement of a 
body and a surface, but the machine is independent of the materiality of its parts 
according to Guattari. It describes the system of connection by which the components 
perturb and affect each other as they are perturbed and affected. Each perturbation shifts 
points of intensification and changes the direction of flows, making some areas dense and 
others dissipate. The territory is remapped, deteritorialisation leading to a re-composition. 
But the machine structure itself, the act of watching, remains the same. The 
indeterminability of the ways in which images will be received as meaningful will effect 
the levels of reorganisation. An image oriented around its most predictable meaning will 
cause intensities to pass along frequently travelled trajectories. An asemiotic expression 
may reorganise the flows between the components in different directions, shifting the 
intensified and detensified areas of the relations. The way films are made and marketed 
presumes and acknowledges the machinic arrangement of viewer and film. Genre, sequel 
and mainstream marketable films seek to reterritorialise the machine’s intensities with 
sufficient perturbation balanced by a reiteration of previous flow patterns. No image or 
signification is guaranteed, so seeking to exploit previous flows within the machine does 
not prevent the flows within any image’s relationship to its meaning leaking beyond its 
limits. The nature of the components is malleable and volatile. Asemiotic components 
may shift the intensities within the machine by exploiting our reliance on expectation in 
order to break it. All that can be guaranteed is the structure itself between the screen and 
viewer.   
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Expressive Cinema: Some Examples of Asemiotics 
 
According to Guattari, semiotics and signifying systems subject the intricate and infinite 
complexity of expression to transmission of information, what Guattari calls a ‘bit’, as a 
coded object of exchange. Represented forms are examples of ‘bits’. They exchange 
information taken from and able to fit back into semiotic systems. We read each bit in an 
image populated with forms. Here is a table, here is a dog, here is a woman, here is a 
man. These forms relate to each other in particular ways. A bit’s form signifies its value 
and relationship to other bits. Gendered characters on screen are both bits to each other 
and to the spectator. Colour, including its saturation, sound and movement are examples 
of cinematic expressions. Red is given the signification of blood to make it an 
informative bit, gesture informs as a substitute for a word and so forth. Expression is 
found before and exceeds its function within a bit of information. Expression emphasises 
content more than form, it is part of the content of a form but not the form itself. Unlike 
information, expression is not received but affects the spectator in indeterminable ways. 
Quoting Metz, Guattari emphasises content in relation to expression: ‘Other elements of 
the filmic text are themselves languages whose matter of content has no precise 
boundaries.’ (1996a:150)  Form as information creates a unified, comprehensible object. 
Meaning imposes itself on expression, remapping it as an object of information. What is 
it to express? Expression seems to have a proximity to abstraction. Abstract verbs 
describe emotions, states of minds, intensities of feeling. Expressive elements could 
tentatively be called ‘feminine’ because, like women, they refuse signification, but are 
given meaning via linkage to a higher order of signification. Colour is abstract, sound is 
abstract, each must be anchored by a form which it can then describe and give 
information about. German expressionism emphasises cinema as more than a series of 
forms to read and understand within a frame. German expressionism foregrounds 
movement, uncanny gestures created by imaginative editing, and the cutting up of forms 
with unusual shadows and angles. The tree branch fingers, frozen shoulders and insect 
head of Graf Orlock (Max Schreck) in Nosferatu (F.W. Murnau, 1922) expresses form 
through tension of flesh. His movement is made with montage rather than filming him 
walking naturally. His form is absence as his shadow crawls up the stairs, form is kinetic 
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in his seemingly contradictory fluid and jolted movement, and form becomes trajectory in 
his sweeping rising, while physically prostrate, from his sarcophagus. Form disappears 
into the shadows, becoming a series of intensities of light and dissolving shade more than 
outline. In The Cabinet of Dr Caligari (Robert Wiene, 1920) the form of somnambulist 
Cesare (Conrad Veidt) angulates with the other irrational angles within each frame. His 
outline is lost as he is camouflaged within the frame, outlines cross divergent trajectories 
and forms are created which do not describe objects but planes or sections of light and 
shade. The content of these newly created outlines do not signify information based on 
form. Shadow, line of black and white, movement and intensifications of points within 
the frame affect the viewer. Character (inherently related to form, which signifies gender) 
and the metonymic relationship of forms to each others to create narrative logic are less 
important than the asemiotic expression from the shadows, reterritorialised lines and 
expressive movements. 
 
When the spectator does not focus on male or female characters as objects of desire, what 
is the pleasure of jolted movement? Of chiaroscuro? When colour, gesture and sound 
evoke desire, pleasure exists beyond desiring a person on screen. Cinema elicits an 
unique form of desire through the experience of its aural, visual, visceral expression. 
Experiencing cinema inclusive of the aspects of expression outside of signification and 
comprehension of form does not rely on established genders and objects which create 
sexual dialectics. It is nonetheless a most compelling aspect. Dario Argento’s Deep Red 
(1974) offers cinematic breaks in its relatively traditional narrative, showing that these 
breaks can (and do) occur in most cinema simply because it is cinema. As a murder 
mystery (properly the Italian genre giallo) it relies on narrative, and forms as clues, but 
there are asignifying breaks which exploit cinematic expressiveness. Immediately the title 
speaks only of colour, which expresses content usually in need of a noun. ‘Red’ is 
formless. Early in the film, psychic Helga Ullman (Macha Méril) sits on stage predicting 
future murders. Her words are clearly important. The camera breaks away from midshot 
to a seemingly arbitrary extreme close up of her mouth dribbling water into the glass 
from which she has sipped. This image breaks the signifying chain. It disinforms the 
speech to which the spectator intensely listens. Perhaps retrospectively we may speak of 
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the symbolic aspect of this image, but at the moment it breaks the chain, it ruptures 
outward, organising the image as connected to us rather than metonymically to the forms 
of the previous and following frame. The image is one of those ‘filmy’ moments, an 
event only available in film, where the texture of a sip of water may be experienced, 
where the spitting of a mouthful becomes mesmerising. Later in Deep Red there is a 
rather brutal murder which, because of its violence and explicit gore, is difficult to watch, 
emphasising the submission of spectator to film. But again, something ruptures the chain. 
Psychiatrist Professor Giordani’s (Glauco Mauri) head is placed on the end of a table and 
a knife is thrust down vertically to stab the back of his neck. The cinesexual aspect of the 
scene is evoked because the camera is fixed onto the knife and not onto the floor, and so 
the still forms move while the moving form is still. Vertigo through trajectory and 
velocity occurs, as the spectator, usually situated in a still position, watches the world 
thrust upward rather than the knife thrust downward.  
 
Surrealist Jan Svankmajer’s three short films which make up Dimensions of Dialogue 
(1982) express through movement and texture. In ‘Passionate Discourse’ two heads of 
plasticine bristle, tear at each other, and create a third element, but because their form is 
mobile they do not deform each other, neither is their progeny a repetition of themselves. 
Fragments of fruit and machinery spin and speed around the frame, composing and 
recomposing from transforming matter in ‘Exhaustive Discussion’ until they are reduced 
to nothing. Guattari claims Dadaists play ‘gratuitous games’ (1996f: 56), cutting up 
reality and thus innocently revealing reality is already an organisation of cut up pieces. In 
reality each piece is unified as an individual and the organisation of each piece is unified, 
hierarchically and genealogically – arborescent. In Dadaism the pieces are pure 
multiplicity, they are defined by their mobile connections with other pieces and their 
movement, so their nature continually breaks and forms new semiotic systems – 
rhizomatic. Guattari sees the use of art in breaking significations as able to become 
catalyst to similar breaks in reality. Surrealism addresses language more explicitly than 
Dadaism to deform it. In ‘Factual Conversation’ two heads poke out objects on their 
tongue. For each object the other head offers a corresponding object – toothbrush, 
toothpaste, shoe, shoelace etc. In the second section these objects meet non-
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corresponding objects – toothbrush to shoelace, bread to toothpaste and so on, showing 
breaking signification through surprising connections. The final section sees the objects 
meet themselves, signifying nothing without a metonymic context. How do we define one 
against itself rather than against its opposite or its place in a signifying chain? Svanmajer 
is interesting as much because of the asemiotic as the break with semiotic. More than 
these games, it is the movement, the jolty stop-motion, the random sounds and the texture 
of the plasticine, or indeed the texture of the stop-motion and the jolt of the plasticine 
which I find most cinematically engaging. The texture and kinetics of the films are 
emphatically visceral and affect the flesh. One’s fingers twitch, stomach clenches, 
entirely due to the strange manoeuvres of the objects and writhing of the plasticine. 
Asignification is not the exchange of signification for no or ambiguous signification but 
an enhancement of the zones within signification which confound and deterritorialise it, 
altering the geography and the pathways of the cartographies of meaning and the 
experiencing of it.  
 
   
The Cinesexual and Cinemasochism 
 
Thus far I have generally sketched some ideas about how the desiring event of cinema 
impacts on the theorisation of subjects. I have asked how we can acknowledge the vital 
role of feminism and the rights of women when we seek to destabilise notions of fixed 
subjectivity and signification? I will now make some even briefer sketches on the way in 
which watching images can be catalyst toward a form of becoming-woman through what 
I have termed ‘cinemasochism’. Becoming is the action of entering the self into a 
participation with another element thus forming a unique relational structure which 
changes both terms and spreads forth to create a series of limitless connections with other 
terms. Becoming does not form a unity but a contagion. Any self’s becoming both 
exploits that self’s specificity and dissipates its quality through its relation to the 
specificities of the other becoming term, changing the organisation and powers of both, 
through unique patternings forming mobile hybrids. Becoming is not ‘like’, or ‘as’ the 
other term. Becoming is a movement rather than a project toward which a goal is 
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identified.  Guattari (and Deleuze and Guattari) define becoming as ‘no longer a question 
of gradual resemblances, ultimately arriving at an identification…it is a question of 
ordering differences to arrive at a correspondence of relations.’ (236) Neither imitation 
nor filiation, becoming is a form of production where the two terms are necessarily 
altered by their relation. Becoming is not the marriage of forms but the alchemy of 
contents, content as verb (expressive, dynamic content) not noun (informative form or 
bit).3 The alliance element is usually traditionally subjugated – woman, animal, and 
music (because its signification is not stable). Deleuze and Guattari’s maligned notion 
that in order to enter into a becoming-otherwise all subjects must first enter into a 
becoming-woman usually focuses on the misguided fetishistic aspect of ‘woman’ over 
the key point that ‘what is essential here is not the object in question, but the 
transformational movement.’ (Guattari, 1996c: 37) Guattari’s claim resonates with his 
points on expression and his use of Metz to critique form. Expression is content in 
transformational movement. Guattari frequently cites dance as an asemiotic art because 
of its emphasis on movement and explicitly the body. Guattari recognises these 
alignments. ‘Each time the body is emphasised in a situation – by dancers, by 
homosexuals, etc. – something breaks with the dominant semiotics that crush these 
semiotics of the body. In heterosexual relations as well, when a man becomes body, he 
becomes feminine.’ (1996f: 47) Referring to traditional binaries, woman is historically 
relegated to the body in the mind/body split. The homosexual also finds himself [sic] in 
the subjugated side of these binaries. Cinema beyond psychoanalysis makes the image 
material, fleshy, because of its ability to affect beyond signification of objects within a 
frame. Asemiotic cinematic pleasure experiences cinema corporeally, not in order to 
transcribe images. But does that necessarily make cinesexuality feminine? And is 
Guattari here returning to the binary systems he repudiates? Another question which both 
contextualises Guattari’s call to becoming body/woman/homo and contradicts itself is: 
should women become woman/homo/body when they are yet to be granted form? Can 
woman be recognised form without being object of information or exchange, without 
being ‘bits’.4 Guattari admits to using the feminine contentiously, as a starting point, 
because it is the first asemiotic break in the dominance of masculine signifying systems. 
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Similarly homosexuality is the first rupture in culture’s presumption of heterosexuality as 
both natural and normal.   
 
Does Guattari call to becoming-woman because of its memory rather than its meaning? 
‘Desire is not informed, informing; it’s not information or content. Desire is not 
something that deforms but that disconnects, changes, modifies, organises other forms 
and then abandons them.’ (1996f: 61)  Does he signify not through what one is but the 
call to not-being, the very problem women have experienced and which was discussed 
above? If there are no longer subjective pathways, does this mean there can no longer be 
regiments, of meaning and power, associated with gender? In ‘Becoming-Woman’, 
Guattari uses the (yet to be signified, or only signified as ‘not-man’) signifier ‘woman’ as 
aligned with the masochist, the prostitute, the homosexual, and other forms of ‘sexual 
minorities’ (1996e: 41). Cinesexuality is not an acknowledged sexuality, but one in which 
all viewers partake, thus when cinema is read as asignifying, cinesexuality is a becoming-
sexual-minority of all viewers. George Stambolian paraphrases Guattari as saying ‘all 
forms of sexual activity are minority forms and reveal themselves as being irreducible to 
homo/hetero oppositions.’ (1996f: 47) Guattari acknowledges that his deferral to binaries 
is a tactic to begin movement. If all sexuality is a becoming-woman, then after becoming-
woman we must ask ‘what next?’ When there is all, there cannot be two.  Guattari claims 
we must all become woman, I claim we are all already cinesexual. All forms of pleasure 
at cinema are bodily, beyond reading/experiencing oppositions. All images are potentially 
a-semiotic, because all exceed signification of form and logical relation to other forms. 
All images rupture out while they move along. The question is not whether something is 
or isn’t a minority sexuality, or asemiotic, but to what extent it elicits the 
reterritorialisation of intensities not reducible to affirmed or exchanged binaries.   
 
Contradictory to much spectatorship theory which posits the gaze as powerful, cinema 
primarily requires the viewer to submit to the image. Psychoanalysis emphasises the 
masochistic positioning of the female spectator but in the face of the cinematic image all 
spectators lose themselves. Cinema presents the paradox of actual worlds which are 
impossible in the ‘real’, thus confounding possibility and reality (the images may not be 
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true, but they are real in that they exist). Impossible here can mean the presentation of 
fantasy worlds or fantasy narratives, because they are extricated from real life (science-
fiction, horror) or because their neat narratives defy the complexity of reality (romances). 
Impossible also refers to the unique patterns of framing, speed, lighting and kinaesthetics 
which constitute cinesexual pleasure. Cinesexuality requires the viewer to come to 
cinema with an openness to the pure possible. The spectator gifts themselves to the 
indeterminability of affects and breaks in signifying systems. Submitting oneself to film 
is submitting to affects which indulge in the breaking down of logic and of the flesh itself 
– horror films, films set in fictitious worlds, dream films. An obvious example of the 
gifting spectator is the viewer of horror film, particularly baroque gore films which 
exploit the breakdown of the body into unsignifiable flesh (what is the gender of 
entrails?) The films of Lucio Fulci, particularly City of the Living Dead (1980) and The 
Beyond (1980) are good examples. Narrative is rudimentary, as is character development. 
Both films are essentially about what happens when the residents of a town in City and a 
hotel in Beyond become living dead, but not relatable to the living dead of horror 
genealogy – they are neither voodoo zombies nor cannibalistic zombies. The films are 
reduced to a series of spectacles which show the body ruptured, altered, suppurating and 
dishevelled. These are not violent aggressive films. Zombification is purely 
transformation, resulting not from murders, just infection presenting with unpredictable 
symptoms. What matters is the matter of the flesh. Watching the dishevelment of bodies 
into organs is a pleasurable trauma. The films are dream like, their events impossible. 
‘Narrative’ (as far as one could call these narratives), events and logic remain unresolved. 
No catharsis is available. The cinesexual spectator should not expect information, by way 
of forms, which may translate to their sexuality. They should experience expression, 
which evokes repulsion desire, bodily ruptures which evoke becoming-body. These films 
are often maligned as incoherent, too visceral, illogical – all ‘feminine’ terms. 
 
Cinema is a solitary experience which enables experiments in self and desire before any 
other persons are considered. This means the self is taken as the primary sacrifice in the 
face of cinesexual desire, and that any attempts to signify the other is prevented, which 
prevents falling into the problems of the oppressed signified (or adamantly not signified 
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in the case of women) by the oppressor. Cinesexuality is expressed not in what one 
watches but how one is altered. It involves a kind of passivity to the possibilities of the 
affects of the image, which is itself passive in that it cannot respond to us after the event 
of cinema. Cinesexuality then is participation of double passivity. It requires submission 
by all viewers, so all viewers must first place themselves as open to the pain and 
innovation of losing self as meaning is forsaken. All viewers take the first step which 
most resonates with the masochistic spectatorial position to which most film theory 
relegated the female spectator. Perhaps all becoming-cinesexual must first pass through 
the minority sexuality of becoming-cinemasochist? Masochism here is more a form of 
openness, a sacrifice of signification not a repetitive pattern of pain. Masochism describes 
the hurt involved in forgoing the self, its associated significations, pre-established 
functions and values, when entering into becomings. There is clearly pain for women to 
forsake the signification as subjects they have yet to receive, but it is as important that, 
while much feminist film theory has called for women to be empowered spectators, we 
acknowledge there is power in submission to asignified desire. The more one is signified 
and reified the more one feels the masochist’s pain/pleasure and the more one should 
submit. Guattari emphasises that becoming is more urgent for men, particularly hetero 
men, than for those entities signified to a lesser degree. Reading an image encloses the 
image within the self’s signification. To be affected by an image acknowledges the 
contagion of the image in altering the viewer, and of the viewer’s act of watching as a 
mix of reading and experiencing. Masochism through foregoing signification includes the 
physical sensations of the experience by the visceral nature of cinematic affect. It is 
simultaneously and inextricably corporeal as much as structural. Submission to 
asignification is a step rather than the taking up of a marginal position, which questions 
the politics and value of desiring positions of power. If sexuality is irreducible to binaries, 
desire (particularly in horror cinema) is irreducible to pleasure/unpleasure, 
delight/disgust, seduction and perversion. Cinesexuality is a form of sexuality enjoyed by 
all bodies. Blanchot emphasises ‘But when we confront things themselves, if we stare at a 
face, a corner of a room, doesn’t it also sometimes happen that we abandon ourselves to 
what we see, that we are at its mercy, powerless before this presence that is suddenly 
strangely mute and passive?’ (80) Blanchot’s demarcation of the ecstasy of desire elicited 
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by submission to the quietest of images seems particularly resonant with cinema which 
encourages us to see and to stare at the mercy of the asignified and asignifiable. The 
event and risks of openness to cinesexuality is the becoming-woman of all viewers, 
masochism as a suffering due to lack of meaning which torments the self as meaningful – 
a cinematic becoming-woman I call cinemasochism. Cinemasochism refuses the notion 
that becoming-man of the female owned sadistic gaze and modes of signification is the 
only form of cinematic spectatorial feminism. Cinemasochism exploits differences 
between and within subjects rather than the taking up of positions by selves. It does not 
require the circulation of value in spectatorial positions, just as asignification does not 
require the circulation of signs as meanings with inherent values.  ‘In the last resort’ 
writes Guattari ‘what will be determinant in the political and aesthetic plane is not the 
words and the content of ideas but essentially a-signifying messages that escape dominant 
ideologies.’ (1996a: 154) Before and beyond what is watched cinema offers us a ‘how to 
desire’ that is different to other forms of desire, both in how we are positioned within the 
machinic assemblage of cinesexual desire and the call to submit to forms of asignification 
both available to all who view images and nowhere else in the world. 
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1 Deleuze and Guattari call this ‘biunivocalisation’, a selection from a series of binaries which unify into 
one sign. The example they use in A Thousand Plateaus is the face. The face is the most immediate 
encounter of readable subjectivity, where flesh becomes sign – Black old woman, young white man and so 
forth. 
2 I do not have the space here to go into the particularities of the televisual as different to the cinematic 
event, suffice to say they have their own separate configurations. My focus on film (including home 
cinema) precludes discussions of the more evident didactic function of many television programmes. 
3 This mercilessly rudimentary discussion of becoming is brief due to constraints of space, but the key 
aspect is Guattari’s notion of ‘woman’ and so it is this term which is emphasised in the expression 
‘becoming-woman’. 
4 Many feminist film theorists have commented on the breakdown of women as object into women as, 
literally, bits in film through framing and focussing on eyes, mouth, breasts and buttock. A dismembering 
of woman’s body fetishises parts while both refusing the whole as subject and affirming whole as object. 
